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I. Introduction
Contract law facilitates exchange by reducing the costs of exchange. The lower
the costs of entering into, performing, and enforcing contracts, the easier it is
for parties to benefit from trade gains. This Article explores whether a broader
view of the "costs" of contracting will disclose additional functions of contract
rules. Many contract rules serve as default rules, rules that fill in gaps parties
do not specifically address. 1 For example, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code consists primarily of default rules for contracts for the sale of goods. If
the contract between buyer and seller does not specifically address matters
such as the amount of damages in case of breach, 2 the rights of the parties
with lost goods 3 warranties of goods are warranted, 4 the terms of delivery, 5
or even the price, 6 then contract law will provide these terms. If the parties do
not wish to rely on such default rules, they can provide their own terms. 7
Default rules reduce the costs of contracting in two principal ways. First,
default rules reduce transaction costs. 8 The parties can rely on contract law to
supply terms, thus, diminishing the costs of negotiating, drafting, and
executing a contract. Reducing transaction costs is key to facilitating exchange
because parties can only benefit from a transaction if the gain from trade
exceeds the transaction costs. Second, some default rules may reduce costs of
strategic behavior. 9 If one party in contract negotiation has material
information unavailable to the other party, the informed party may have an
incentive to engage in strategic behavior. By not disclosing the information, the
informed party may negotiate more favorable terms than it would in the event
of disclosure. Although such strategic behavior may benefit the informed party,
the reduction in trade gains may outweigh it. For example, the nondisclosed
information could involve a risk that the uninformed party could have
efficiently guarded against. Default rules may reduce such strategic behavior
by providing an incentive to reveal private information that can increase gains
from trade.
This Article also discusses another role for default rulesreducing costs of
status competition. Default rules principally serve to reduce transaction costs
and strategic behavior costs, but they also accomplish other functions. 10 The
hypothetical behavior of parties that measure the costs and benefits of the
transaction in absolute terms provide a basis transaction and strategic
behavior cost analysis. Parties in actual negotiations, however, often shift to
measuring things in relative terms because of concerns about status. The
participants enter into contract negotiations to achieve gains from trade. The
process of negotiation itself, however, may become a competition. Rather than
simply trying to achieve their original goals, parties sometimes shift in whole or
in part to "win" the bargaining. Such status competition may have two types of
costs. It may increase the resources expended in bargaining by making the

1
Electronic
Electronic
copy ofcopy
this paper
available
is available
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956651
at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=956651

negotiations longer or more complex, and it may reduce gains from trade by
causing negotiations to fall through. 11 The shift can harm the parties as a
whole by changing the negotiation from one with potential gains from trade
for both parties to one where any gain for one party results in a perceived loss
to the other party. This Article also addresses how default rules of contract law
may operate to reduce such costs of status competition during negotiation. 12
II. How some default rules reduce transaction costs by supplying terms that
parties would have agreed on
The transaction cost analysis of default rules is a straightforward application of
the Coase theorem, the analytical tool that underlies much economic analysis
of law. 13 The Coase theorem states that if transaction costs between parties
are zero, the parties by agreement will allocate property rights efficiently. 14 In
other words, rational parties will make trades if the parties can make economic
gains and transaction costs do not stand in the way. 15 Suppose a farmer has a
plot of land worth $ 1000 a year to the farmer and use of that land would be
worth $ 1200 a year to a neighboring farmer. Without transaction costs, for
example costs of negotiating, executing, or enforcing a lease, the parties could
realize a $ 200 gain from trade if the second farmer could agree to lease the
land for more than $ 1000, and less than $ 1200. If transaction costs were $
300, however, the mutually beneficial transaction would not occur, because the
cost would outweigh the benefit to the parties. Therefore, the law can facilitate
exchange by reducing transaction costs.
Contract law reduces transaction costs by providing a background of default
rules that make it unnecessary for contracting parties to expend resources in
bargaining about every possible aspect of a contract. 16 High transaction costs
may not completely block bargaining, but the existence of any transaction
costs at all will reduce the overall amount of exchange. In addition, if the
parties had to address every possible contingency to form a binding contract,
the transaction costs of negotiating and drafting would rise prohibitively high. 17
Because contract law provides default rules, the parties need not expend
transaction costs in reaching specific agreement about every single aspect of
the transaction.
Similar reasoning can also apply to determine appropriate default rules. If the
parties could bargain costlessly, then they could reach an efficient agreement
about every aspect of the contract. 18 In deciding what default rules are
appropriate, a legislature or court may determine what terms the parties would
agree on. Thus, the transaction cost analysis yields an approach that courts
have in fact long applied, possibly termed the "wouldhave" approach 19 the
default rule to fill a gap in a contract should be the provision that the parties
would have included, had they considered it. 20
III. How some default rules reduce costs of strategic behavior by forcing
disclosure of material information
Considering costs of strategic behavior suggests that some default rules serve
not simply to fill in gaps with what the parties would have agreed on, but
rather serve to induce parties to address some matters, specifically, to reveal
material information. Game theory analysis 21 suggests that transaction costs
are not the only barrier to realizing gains to trade. Even where transaction
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costs are low, parties may fail to maximize gains from trade because their
conflicting interests may induce strategic behavior. 22 Where parties have
asymmetric information, one party knows something the other does not, the
"wouldhave" approach discussed above may encourage inefficient strategic
choices. In particular, if the default rule governing one area of the contract
favors one party, then that party may choose not to address the matter during
contract negotiations to prevent disclosing material information.
A leading analysis demonstrates the costs of strategic behavior rigorous with
respect to default provisions on consequential damages. 23 Both parties may
not have incentives to seek the agreement with the greatest overall benefit.
The "wouldhave" approach assumes that the parties will maximize the gains
from trademaximize the size of the pie to be divided between them. 24 One
party with private information, however, might have an incentive to bargain for
a larger share of a smaller gain from tradea larger slice of a smaller pie. 25
Default rules that differ from the "wouldhave" approach may discourage such
behavior. A scenario drawn from Hadley v. Baxendale 26 illustrates the interplay
using a contract between a shipper and a carrier. 27 The shipper is a miller that
wants to have a broken crank shaft transported to a repair shop in another
city. If the carrier does not deliver the crank shaft at the agreed time, the mill
will shut down for a time, resulting in lost revenue for the miller. The carrier is
in the best position to take efficient precautions against the risk of the shaft's
late delivery. If the shipping contract does not address the issue of
consequential damages, the question is whether the default rule should grant
consequential damages to the shipper in the event of breach by the carrier.
As discussed above, the transaction cost approach would find the term that the
parties would have agreed on, had they addressed the issue. If the carrier was
in the best position to reduce the risk of the crank shaft going astray by taking
extra precautions, then the parties likely would have placed the risk of
consequential damages on the carrier. 28 Such a rule, however, could lead to
inefficiencies. The carrier might deal with many shippers, only a few of whom
would suffer considerable consequential damages from late shipments. Courts
deem these shippers as "highdamage" shippers. A default rule making carriers
in the best position to avoid losses liable for consequential damages would
place possible consequential damages on the carrier with respect to every
shipper. Carriers may also prefer to charge more for highdamage shippers
than for lowdamage shippers to pay for the extra precautions. To do that,
however, carriers need to identify both highdamage and lowdamage
shippers. Highdamage shippers would have an incentive not to disclose their
status and simply rely on the default rule. 29 The carrier may distinguish
between highdamage and lowdamage shippers and deal with them
accordingly. 30 If there are only a few highdamage shippers, however, it might
be less costly for the carrier to occasionally pay consequential damages than to
classify every shipper as a lowdamage or highdamage shipper. 31 Accordingly,
the carrier under the "wouldhave" rule would not take efficient precautions. 32
An approach different from the "wouldhave" approach could prevent such an
inefficiency. If the default rule awards consequential damages, highdamage
shippers have a strategic incentive to pass as lowdamage shippers. 33 If they
inform the carrier that they are highdamage shippers, the carrier will take the
efficient precautions to avoid loss, but will also charge a higher price for the
shipment to reflect those precautions and possible damages. If the default rule
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grants consequential damages, the shipper is insured against loss, and can
avoid the higher price by failing to disclose. 34 The Hadley rule, however,
fosters efficient behavior precisely by differing from the rule that the parties
would have reached, through bargaining. Hadley denies consequential
damages unless the carrier could foresee the loss. For protection of
consequential damages, the miller must therefore disclose its status as a
potential highdamage shipper. Then, the parties will adopt the term that the
"wouldhave" rule dictates providing for consequential damages. But the
carrier will know which shipments require precautions, and will charge high
damage shippers extra in exchange for taking those efficient precautions. 35
Rather than simply mimicking the agreement the parties would have reached,
some default rules force efficient disclosure of information by differing from the
term the parties would have chosen. 36
By simply filling in gaps with terms the parties would have chosen, the
transaction cost approach views contract default rules as a method of less
ening the cost for parties to reach an efficient bargain. Strategic behavior costs
further explain how default rules may induce parties to disclose information, to
reach the efficient bargain. 37 The next section turns to a different type of cost
costs of status competition.
IV. Status competition costs defined
The transaction cost and strategic behavior cost analyses review the costs and
benefits in terms of the parties' transaction costs and the parties' receipts in
the exchange. In so doing, the analyses assume away considerations of status,
although status is often an important factor in actual negotiations. Like
economics generally, economic analysis of law has paid scant attention to the
fact that people frequently seek goods and services not only as ends in
themselves, but also as means of establishing position with others. 38 As
economists sometimes note 39 social sciences like psychology, sociology and
anthropology have found repeatedly, the desire to compare well against others
influences parties' decisions. 40 Of course, it is not an esoteric observation of
social science that people often prefer to earn more than others or have things
that few people have. The marketing of goods and services confirms this
everyday. Most advertising appeals directly to the widespread desire to own
things that purportedly signal superior taste, wealth, or judgment, and to
receive services that will raise people on various scales of comparison. 41 Such
"relative preferences" are not something foreign to economic analysis of law
but rather constitute a few of the many items generally excluded from the
analysis. 42 A full un derstanding of how contract law affects negotiations,
however, cannot disregard this factor that often controls the negotiation. 43
The costs of status competition flow from a particular type of desire for status,
the desire to be the "winner" of a negotiation. This desire may have a
detrimental effect on negotiations by shifting a party's goal from obtaining a
beneficial trade to winning a negotiation point. Although economic analysis of
law affecting bargaining may assume away the complications of status
competition, lawyers and others writing about the actual process of negotiation
regularly address the matter. In the words of a book often used in teaching
negotiation in law school, if such a shift occurs, "Your ego becomes identified
with your position. You now have a new interest in 'saving face' . . . making it
less and less likely that any agreement will wisely reconcile the parties' original
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interests." 44 Others have termed it as motivational transformation. It begins
as an interest in doing as well as one can, and shifts to an interest in prevailing
over the other side. 45 Negotiations can go awry where such issues of status
interfere with parties seeking their original goals. 46 Indeed, parties may
become unable to agree to a transaction that gives them what they actually
want, simply because such agreement would cause loss of status. 47
Negotiation texts devote much space to techniques for alleviating such
impassesto permit parties to escape the status competition without "losing
face." 48 If widespread status competition requires negotiators to develop
techniques to deal with it, then the law that affects negotiations should also
have mechanisms to reduce such costs.
The breakdown of negotiations for the sale of a house provides a clear example
of status competition costs. Suppose Seller has a house that she would gladly
sell for $ 100,000, and Buyer would gladly purchase for $ 110,000, with
transaction costs of $ 1,000. Thus, the parties have a potential gain from trade
of $ 10,000, minus $ 1,000 transaction costs. The transaction cost approach
would assume that they would make an efficient agreement. Consideration of
strategic behavior costs would likewise predict that the parties would bargain
to an agreement. 49 Game theory may predict a likely price if the parties make
further assumptions about such matters as which party would make offers, the
permissible amount of rounds of offers and counteroffers, how long each round
took, whether either party had market power, what information the parties had
or could infer about the other's desired price, and how much the delay cost
each party. 50
That result relies on the usual assumption that the parties' goals remained
constant over succeeding rounds of bidding. The dynamics of the bargaining
process, however, might change the manner by which the parties evaluate
possible outcomes. In a sense, the bargaining process is a competition to
secure a greater part of the $ 9,000 surplus. If the parties begin to consider
the competition important in itself, rather than solely a means for fulfilling their
original wishes, the bargaining could fall through. The bids may change the
parties' goals. 51 If buyer makes a low bid, seller may be insulted: Likewise, if
seller rejects or responds with a high offer, buyer may be affronted. 52 At some
point, each might decide that she would not make any concession beyond a
certain point. Seller might refuse to sell to buyer for less than $ 106,000,
although she would still sell to a different buyer for $ 100,000. Similarly, buyer
might not buy from seller for more than $ 104,000, although she would still
pay $ 110,000 for a similar house. 53 In that event no range of agreement
would exist. Even if such status competition does not end the negotiations, it
could increase the transaction costs, by increasing the resources such as time,
money, and aggravation that the parties expend on the negotiations. Thus, the
costs of status competition in negotiation constitute both decreased gains from
trade and increased transaction costs.
Negotiation over the price term is only one possible source of status
competition. The parties would also need to agree on a number of other
contractual terms. Considerations of status could also arise from matters such
as who must raise a subject first, 54 whether objective standards to govern an
issue existed, 55 and whether a party must change his or her position in the
negotiation, thereby "losing face." 56 If every transaction had such hazards, the
costs on trade would be great. The next section discusses how pervasive status
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competition can severely interfere with trade, as a prelude to showing how
default rules are one tool that reduces such hazards.
V. A stark example of status competition obstructing exchange
In order to set the issue in relief, we can turn to a society that lacked many of
the social mechanisms that have developed in modern commercial society to
ameliorate status competition in negotiation. Medieval Icelandic society
provides excellent examples of the possible hazards of status competition.
Although Iceland had a highly sophisticated legal system, it lacked certain legal
and commercial elements that serve to reduce such costs in modern
commercial society. Iceland demonstrates how pervasive and costly status
competition can be, and thus, how important the various social and legal
mechanisms that alleviate such costs are. As described in the sagas, Medieval
Iceland 57 had limited forms for the exchange of goods. Status competition, in
the form of competition for honor at great risk and expense, further restricted
the flow of goods, as the following condensed example drawn from Njal's saga
shows. As the succeeding section will discuss, similar conflicts can cause
negotiations in modern society to founder.
Gunnar Hamundarson was a great warrior, the head of an extended household
and the leader of a formidable kin group. 58 Gunnar's generosity and a famine
combined to leave his stores of hay and food perilously low. 59 He went with
some of his kin to Otkel Skarfsson to attempt to purchase supplies. 60 Otkel had
ample supplies; his reserves were so full that some would spoil before he could
use them. At this point, both the transaction cost analysis and strategic
behavior cost analysis would predict that a mutually beneficial exchange would
take place. The potential gain from the trade was large. Otkel had something,
part of his supplies, that was worth much more to Gunnar, preventing
starvation among his dependents, than it was to Otkel, watching it rot. Gunnar
was willing to compensate Otkel for the supplies. In fact, Gunnar later offered
to pay Otkel twice the value of the supplies. 61 Thus, Otkel could receive
something that would not just replace the value of the supplies, but retain its
value. The parties were face to face and ready for immediate exchange. Thus,
transaction costs would not obstruct an exchange. Likewise, strategic behavior
analysis would generally predict that two parties with such a potential surplus
from trade, with one party having what we might call "market power", would
arrive at an agreement.
Icelandic society lacked the wide array of mechanisms that facilitate exchange
of hay and food today: commodity exchanges, supermarkets, etc. Nonetheless,
the parties could have accomplished the transaction at issue with the limited,
but powerful, forms of transfer available to them: sale; gift, which would be
reciprocated in the future, or a hostile taking, whereupon the taker might
voluntarily pay compensation. 62 Gunnar attempted the first two routes: he
offered to purchase the supplies, but Otkel declined to sell. 63 Gunnar then
suggested that Otkel make a gift of the supplies, and leave to Gunnar the
question of compensation. Although Otkel had no fear that Gunnar would make
adequate compensation, he again refused. 64 One of Gunnar's party then
suggested taking what they needed and leaving its worth, but Gunnar declined
to raid at that time and left without the necessary supplies. 65 Consideration
of status governed both parties actions.
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If the sole issue were the value of the goods and the compensation the buyer
offered, a mutually beneficial exchange would have taken place. Status
competition, matters of honor and prestige, however, prevented the exchange.
66
Status in Medieval Icelandic society depended on honor, and one's honor
could rise and fall in every dealing with others. 67 Honor, moreover, was not
measured in absolute terms. Rather, one's honor was defined relative to
others. 68 One could lose honor by not avenging an insult 69 or a blow, 70 or by
receiving a poor place at a feast table. 71 Accordingly members of Medieval
Icelandic society paid, constant attention to matters of honor. In some
instances this attention extended so far as offering to kill to keep the best
place at a feast table. 72
Considerations of honor attended each mode of transfer of goods. A gift
conferred honor on the giver, but carried the risk that the honor could be lost if
the recipient insulted the giver by reciprocating quickly, by reciprocating after
a long delay, or not reciprocating at all. 73 A sale could leave the parties' honor
unchanged, but only if they managed to avoid several pitfalls. For example,
characterizing a transfer as gift, sale, or hostile taking was a matter of
interpretation. A gift might be seen as conceding to a threatened hostile
taking. An offer to purchase could constitute a veiled threat to make a hostile
taking. 74 A refusal of an offer to purchase could represent a challenge to make
a hostile taking, 75 a challenge which could not be refused without loss of
honor. Other pitfalls arose from the need to complete the transaction over
time. Ordinarily, the buyer would not pay on the spot. Instead the buyer would
arrange for future payment, which left open the risk of more insult in either
deciding the terms of repayment or failing to follow those terms. 76 Finally,
refusing an offer to buy or the solicitation of a gift resulted in humiliation of the
offeror. 77 As the next section discusses, modern transactions suffer from
analogous pitfalls.
The interaction between Gunnar and Otkel aroused many of these con
siderations. Otkel may have interpreted Gunnar's sincere offer to purchase as a
threat to take. 78 Thus, although it would have made both better off in absolute
terms, could not accept the offer because he might have lost honor by yielding
to a threat. Otkel may also have regarded the speed with which Gunnar raised
the issue as a means of keeping a social distance and superiority. 79 Again,
accepting the offer would have meant acquiescing in that evaluation. Speed in
negotiation, which would facilitate exchange in absolute terms, would interfere
by raising questions of status. Considerations of status in the future could also
have interfered with the immediate exchange. Otkel may have declined to
make a gift because it would require him to establish a social bond with
Gunnar, and thus, depend on Gunnar reciprocating in a manner that would not
diminish Otkel. 80 Finally, a person might forgo a mutually beneficial exchange
in absolute terms in order to attempt to gain in relative terms: Gunnar's offers
gave Otkel an opportunity to diminish Gunnar's honor simply by refusing him.
81
Such considerations are less likely to interfere with many of the transactions
in a modern commercial society. The reason is not that modern people are any
less concerned with issues of status. As discussed in the next section, parties
can easily lose what they desire in absolute terms because they become
derailed by considerations of their position relative to others. Rather, many
more commercial and legal mechanisms exist today to facilitate trade with
fewer risks of status competition. A contemporary Gunnar could simply go to a
store and buy what he needed, with little risk that the merchant would refuse
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to sell because of risk to their honor. By providing prices set by supply and
demand rather than by individual negotiation, market prices have the effect of
reducing status competition costs. Many transactions still require negotiation,
however, and status considerations can cause negotiations to run aground. The
next section turns to how writers on negotiation have identified a number of
ways that issues of status interfere with negotiations. The section further
examines how default rules in contract law can serve to reduce such status
competition.
VI. How default rules reduce costs of status competition
This section will discuss how default rules of contract law ameliorate some
pitfalls of negotiation by providing a given framework for exchange. One might
compare it to the way that the existence of a market price makes it
unnecessary for a buyer and seller to negotiate the price term. In the
hypothetical above about a failed sale of a house, 82 the status competition
arose with regard to the purchase price. Buyer and seller began the negotiation
concerned only about the price, but their concern shifted to a desire to win the
negotiation, even at the risk of forgoing their original goals. For many
transactions in modern commercial society, such status competition would not
occur, because buyer and seller do not negotiate about the price. Rather, the
market determines the price. Where goods or services are sold in a "thick"
market, supply and demand set price and other key terms. 83 In such
transactions, there need be no bargaining, and accordingly, no status
competition to "win" the bargaining. Similarly, the market may set other terms
of the contract. Indeed, contract law has recognized this by relying on "usage
of trade" to provide default terms where parties do not agree on certain terms.
84
More generally, default rules may make it unnecessary for parties to
negotiate about terms or may make such negotiation less likely to descend into
status competition. Thus, default rules do not just reduce the transaction costs
and strategic behavior costs of negotiation, but also help keep the parties'
bargaining from leading to its own breakdown.
The more that potential contracting parties have to bargain, the more likely it
is that they will seek to get a better deal in comparison to the other party as
well as desirable contract terms. 85 In general terms, the more matters that are
addressed by default rules that supply contractual provisions, the fewer
stumbling blocks will arise in bargaining toward an agreement. Certain matters
might be more sensitive to concerns of status, and thus especially apt to be
addressed by default rules. For example, the U.C.C. imposes an obligation of
good faith in every contract, although the parties may define what constitutes
good faith for the purposes of their contract. 86 One justification for the rule is
that the vast majority of contracting parties would want such a provision in
their contracts, so including it automatically reduces transaction costs.
Although this rationale has merit, the actual transaction costs saved are rather
small because including a provision in the contract that the "parties shall act in
good faith" would not be costly. A second justification, one of status
competition costs, arises if we consider what it would take to get that provision
into the contract. One party would propose that the contract require both
parties to act in good faith. This might prompt the other to be insulted, as
though her good faith had been questioned, thus invoking questions of relative
worth on the scale of trustworthiness. The U.C.C. reduces such risks by
including the obligation without the need for the parties to address the matter.
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Similar considerations could affect mundane provisions, such as the rules
governing remedies in the event of breach. If contract law did not supply
damage rules by default, parties would have to bargain for damages. That,
however, would require parties to state, in effect, "Here is what should happen
if you breach the contract." The very suggestion that one party may breach
could again arouse feelings of status. The U.C.C. avoids these problems by
supplying such terms automatically.
Commentators have described a number of ways that the dynamics of
negotiation may create what we have termed status competition. As with
issues of status generally, economic analysis conventionally assumes away
such considerations or consigns them to irrational behavior beyond the scope
of economic analysis. 87 Discussions of actual bargaining, however, do confront
such considerations. Negotiating to an agreement involves more than simply
mechanically deciding the terms of the contract. Rather, the parties are likely
to care not just about the final terms agreed upon, but also whether the
negotiating process and final terms reflect well or badly on them. As
negotiation has increasingly become a skill recognized in the curricula of law
schools, lawyers pay increasing attention to such dynamics. A core
consideration in negotiating is accommodating the opponent's desire to look
good to others appear to have entered into a favorable agreement. 88 The
process of bargaining can cause the parties' goals to shift "from mutual
satisfaction to victory." 89 Negotiating texts are replete with techniques that
negotiators use to address such problems and to prevent them from arising.
Here I consider whether default rules may also serve to ameliorate such
problems.
For example, it may be considered a sign of inferior status to raise an issue. 90
Conversely, where a default rule provides a term in the event that the parties
do not address the matter, neither party needs to raise the subject.
Negotiating for concessions presents another problem of status. Parties in
negotiation frequently have a great aversion to making concessions because it
implies defeat. 91 An impasse may arise where a party has taken a position that
it would be willing to change in absolute terms, but is unwilling to change its
position because that will cause loss of status. 92 Just as default rules make it
unnecessary to raise a subject, they also make it unnecessary to change
positions on a subject. Rather, the parties may decide to fill a gap with a
default term. Thus, they provide a means to "save face." 93
In addition, default rules could provide objective standards. Negotiations have
less the flavor of a pure competition if the parties can consider matters with
respect to external objective standards. 94 Using objective standards can turn
negotiation away from a "constant battle for dominance" which may threaten
the negotiations. 95 The default rules, whose source is a court or legislature,
represent an independent and authoritative source of the term at issue.
Similarly, the default rule can at least provide a benchmark that may prevent
extreme differences between the parties' positions. Empirical research shows
that an extreme offer will likely elicit an extreme counteroffer which in turn,
decreases the chance of the parties reaching agreement. 96 The existence of a
default rule will likely make a party think twice before it takes the risk of
making an extreme offer. 97
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Default rules could also reduce status competition costs in a manner analogous
to the way the Hadley rule discussed above prompted efficient disclosure to
reduce strategic behavior costs. The Hadley rule prompts highdamage
shippers to differentiate themselves from lowdamage shippers by disclosing
material information to the other contracting party. 98 Default rules could also
elicit information relevant to status competition. Students of negotiation have
differentiated between "competitive" and "cooperative" negotiators. 99 They
also note that frequently one party is mistaken about the approach of the other
party, and as a result, makes costly errors. In particular, cooperative
negotiators may mistakenly assume that the negotiator they deal with is also
willing to cooperate. 100 In some circumstances, default rules could help reduce
this problem. Where a default rule addresses a matter, a party may indicate its
position by the approach it takes. If a party asks for a rule more favorable than
the default rule, that may indicate a competitive approach, while willingness to
rely on the default rule may signal cooperativeness. Such signals are not as
unambiguous as a highdamage shipper offering to pay extra in return for
insurance, but nonetheless may reveal private information.
Thus, default rules serve to reduce possible conflicts in bargaining by
alleviating the need to negotiate specific terms. This, however, could create
tension with other functions of default rules. As discussed above, in some
settings default rules reduce strategic behavior costs, creating an incentive to
negotiate, and therefore disclose private information. 101 In deciding what
default rule should govern a particular matter, a lawmaker might need to
decide whether the greater hazard is strategic behavior, which would call for
a default rule that prompts negotiation on the matter, or status competition,
which calls for a default rule that makes negotiation unnecessary. Such
conflicts would be less likely with respect to transaction costs. In general, the
same default rules would reduce status competition costs that reduce
transaction costs. If the default rules supply the term that the parties would
have agreed on then they need not negotiate about it which reduces both
transaction costs and the chance of status competition. There could be a
conflict in some settings, however. A court or legislature could choose a default
rule that the majority of parties to such a contract would include. Similarly, the
court could try to select a rule that is more likely to fit in a setting especially
prone to considerations of status. 102 Whether such tensions exist will depend
on the nature of the contract and the parties. For example, contracts for sales
of goods are likely to require a different approach than prenuptial contracts.
Consequently, courts and legislators that formulate and apply default rules
should consider the likely effects of the rules on the dynamics of negotiating
various types of contracts.
VII. Conclusion
Default rules in contract law serve to reduce the effects of destructive status
competition in negotiation. 103 Parties enter into contract negotiations in order
to realize gains from trade. Presumably, if the negotiations result in
agreement, then both parties, are better off. Negotiations may founder,
however, if dynamics of the negotiation cause issues of status to interf Apr
04/01/98 Wed 9:25amS Yere with the parties seeking a mutually beneficial
exchange. Default rules fill gaps in contracts. In fact, sometimes negotiations
may be less likely to fail if the parties do not need to address issues. Likewise,
the use of default rules permits parties to not address an issue which the party
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does not want to raise during negotiation or to concede to the other parties'
position. Negotiations are also less likely to slip into status competition if the
parties can refer to objective standards, which default rules may supply. In
addition, default rules may aid parties in determining whether they are dealing
with competitive or cooperative negotiators, and thereby avoid the costs of
misinterpreting the actions of the other party. Thus, default rules function not
only as a means to reducing the expenditure of resources in an exchange, but
also to reduce the chance that negotiations cause their own demise. 104
FOOTNOTES:
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n1 There has been considerable recent theoretical work on default rules in
contract law, from economic, philosophical, and doctrinal viewpoints. See, e.g.,
Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 824 nn.1019 (1992) (referring to recent
theoretical discussions of default rules); Richard Craswell, Contract Law,
Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489, 496501
(1989) (addressing moral obligation of keeping promises); Laurence A.
Cunningham, Hermeneutics and Contract Default Rules: An Essay on Lieber
and Corbin, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 2225 (1995) (suggesting hermeneutics could
enrich study of default rules); Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships
and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J. Legal Stud. 535 local
cite (1990) (discussing default rules in commercial contracts); Richard
Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related
Doctrines, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 715 (1993) (discussing choices in applying
property and liability rules); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining With Uncertainty,
Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A Default Rule For Precontractual Negotiations,
44 Hastings L.J. 621, 672689 (1993) (proposing rational handling of
contractual goals through judiciary supplied default rule); see also Robert E.
Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J.
Legal Stud. 597, 597616 (1990) (commenting on Gillette's work regarding
selection of default rule).
n2 See U.C.C. §§ 2703 to 2715 (1995) (covering sellers' and buyers' rights
and remedies).
n3 See U.C.C. §§ 2509, 2510 (1995) (addressing risk of loss without
breach).
n4 See U.C.C. §§ 2314, 2315 (1995) (addressing implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for particular purpose).
n5 See U.C.C. §§ 2308, 2319 to 2324 (1995) (defining commercial
delivery terms).
n6 See U.C.C. § 2305 (providing for open price terms in contracts).
n7 See U.C.C. § 1102(3) (permitting parties to vary most terms by
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agreement).
n8 See infra note 1320 and accompanying text (analyzing successfully
resolution of financial aspects of transactions).
n9 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency
and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729, 735737 (1992)
[hereinafter Strategic Inefficiency] (suggesting when costless contracting
occurs, choice of default rules still matters); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale
L.J. 87, 8895 (1989) (hereinafter Default Rules) (introducing theoretical
design of efficient defaults); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and
the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 Yale L.J. 615 (1990)
(arguing against established default rules).
n10 See Default Rules, supra note 9, at 93 (suggesting contracting
incompleteness caused by transaction costs). For example, some default rules
could reduce the costs of judicial enforcement of contracts. Id. Default rules
can induce parties to agree explicitly about matters that a court could later
decide less efficiently. Id.
n11 See infra notes 3856 and accompanying text (suggesting importance of
personal status in negotiations).
n12 See infra notes 85101 and accompanying text (highlighting competitive
spirit in obtaining better deal).
n13 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law 22 (4th ed.
1992) (stating Coase theorem established framework analyzing property rights
assignment liability in economic terms); Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law
and Economics 5 (1988) (analyzing Coase theorem interims of efficiency to
parties); A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 11 (2d ed.
1989) (asserting Coase theorem states efficient outcome occurs with zero
transaction costs).
n14 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 2 J. L. & Econ. 1
(1960) (discussing Coase theorem and impact). There is no single canonical
statement of the Coase theorem. Id. The article that introduced the idea never
explicitly analyzed the theorem. Id. Rather, only as the analytical power of the
article's analysis became clear as it extended to other areas of law did the
analysis become known as the Coase theorem. More recently, it garnered its
author the Nobel prize in economics in 1991. Id.
n15 See Posner, supra note 13 at 51 (providing examples of just
compensation in transactions).
n16 Cf. Posner, supra note 13 at 9596 (implying failure to impose efficient
term results in increased and avoidable transaction costs); Polinsky, supra note
13 at 27 (opining contract rules desirable because costly to negotiate contract
providing for all contingencies).
n17 Cf. Cooter & Ulen, supra note 13 at 229 (suggesting fundamental
economic problem of allocating risk of contingencies).
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n18 See Posner, supra note 13, at 9596 (stating contract law achieves goal
of efficiency).
n19 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 204 cmt. d (1979) (discussing
probability and reasonableness of supplying omitted terms) "Sometimes it is
said that the search is for the term the parties would have agreed to if the
question had been brought to their attention." Id.; see Richard E. Speidel,
Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 Cornell L. Rev.
785, 8045 (1982) (describing Restatement rule as vague). Speidel states the
rule appears "strangely isolated from the bargaining dynamics of the parties."
Id. at 805. He provides an early analysis expressing some skepticism about
whether such a rule lends any guidance to a court. Id.
n20 See Default Rules, supra note 9, at 8995 (discussing economic analysis
relying on "wouldhave" rule in disciplines of corporate, contract, and
bankruptcy law).
n21 See Ian Ayres, The Possibility of Inefficient Corporate Contracts, 60 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 387, 389 (1991) (discussing methods for choosing efficient
contractual defaults around which parties may negotiate). The use of game
theory in the economic analysis of law is aptly described as part of the second
generation of law and economics. See Randal C. Picker, Law and Economics:
Intellectual Arbitrage, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 127, 128 (1993) (explaining need to
evolve discipline of law and economics to keep pace with rapid changes).
n22 See Strategic Inefficiency, supra note 9 at 736 (suggesting carrier's
choices may influence strategic behavior of shippers); Default Rules, supra
note 9, at 94 (revealing information withheld due to parties; strategic choices).
n23 See Default Rules, supra note 9, at 9495.
n24 See id. (discussing strategic behavior parties engage in during
contractual negotiation).
n25 See id. at 100 (stating informed parties may benefit by strategically
withholding information).
n26 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
n27 See Default Rules, supra note 9, at 10102 (setting forth penalty default
of not awarding unforeseeable consequential damages). The parties may not
have wanted this result. Id.
n28 See id. (suggesting carrier more efficient bearer of risk so miler should
have disclosed information).
n29 See id. at 103 (opining highdamage millers may intentionally withhold
information making contracts more efficient).
n30 See id. at 11011.
n31 See id. at 10203.
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n32 See Default Rules, supra note 9, at 111 (noting carriers take low level of
precautions).
n33 See id.
n34 See id.
n35 See id. at 10910 (predicting highdamage millers should expect to bear
costs of increased precaution and transactions).
n36 See id. at 103 (stressing courts should choose different defaults to
counteract strategic information withholding behavior).
n37 See Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game
Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 215, 225 (1990)
(distinguishing transaction costs from strategic behavior costs). Katz uses the
terms "transaction costs" and "strategic behavior costs" as separate
categories, but one can define the inefficiencies strategic behavior causes to
count as part of transaction costs. Id. Thus, transaction costs could have two
components: (1) costs of implementation which constitute the real resources
used up in bring contracting parties together, in executing and administering
the resulting agreement, in enforcing any bargain reached, and in settling any
disputes that arise and (2) costs of strategic behavior which are losses suffered
because bargainers have the incentive to maximize their individual gains rather
than the total surplus from exchange. See id. at 22526.
n38 See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 Yale L.J. 1, 12
(1992) (noting analysis of preferences for position of ten deferred).
n39 See McAdams, supra note 38, at 12 (highlighting Thorstein Veblen as
brave economist noting failure to recognize preferences for distinction). Veblen
coined the phrase "conspicuous consumption" to explain "consumption for the
purpose of creating an impression on others rather than for the satisfaction of
need. . . ." The MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics 449 (David W. Pearce ed.,
4th ed. 1992); see McAdams, supra note 38, at 1213 & n.35 (discussing
Veblen's criticism of classical economics' failure to consider individuals' desire
for status distinction).
n40 See McAdams, supra note 38, at 2844 (discussing studies and theories
establishing people's interest in income and goods as symbols of status).
n41 See Arthur Lubow, Annals of Advertising: This Vodka Has Legs, The New
Yorker, Sept. 12, 1994, at 62 (describing development of Stolichnaya Christall
supreme vodka advertising campaign appealing largely to status).
n42 See Douglas G. Baird et al., Game Theory and the Law. A recent text
notes "there is a vast experimental literature on bargaining which indicates
that negotiating behavior does not always conform to the economic model." Id.
at 242 (1994). Game theoretical models of bargaining typically assume for
simplicity's sake that "rational" parties would not refuse offers simply because
such offers are unfair or because the other party receives a better deal. See
Avinash K. Dixit & Barry J. Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive
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Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life 4546 (1991) (examining
bargaining problem involving offers and counteroffers to reach an agreement);
Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information 228 (1989) (applying standard
economic theory to bargaining theory). Contract negotiations are not the only
negotiations affected by such considerations. A recent article discusses
experimental evidence of "psychological barriers to litigation settlement,"
including the effect of interpersonal comparisons on decisions about whether to
agree to settlement. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological
Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 Mich. L. Rev.
107, 143 (1994) (stating people act based on their perception of treatment by
others).
n43 See Posner, supra note 13, at 34 (explaining how man rationalizes his
economic choices). Including considerations such as preferences and societal
positioning in economic analysis of law may violate the assumption of
rationality. See id. Economic analysis of law typically assumes that individuals
behave rationally, in the sense that they attempt to maximize the satisfaction
of their various wants with the resources available to them. Id. One might
argue irrational behavior on the part of people who forego beneficial exchanges
because they want to be the "winner" of the negotiation. See id. Economic
analysis, however, has already securely accepted an analogous type of
"irrationality"risk aversion. See id. Many people would rather have $ 10,000
than half a chance of winning $ 20,000, even though both have an "absolute"
expected value of $ 10,000. In other words, many people in such
circumstances are risk averse. See id. Economic analysis of the law has
explored many ways in which the law serves to reduce or redistribute risk. See
Polinsky, supra note 13, at 53, 59, 67, 7980, 11112 (incorporating risk
aversion into analysis of each subject). Just as risk aversion causes individuals'
valuations to vary, individuals' concerns about status similarly affect their
valuation of goods, services, and of the transactions in which rights change
hands. See McAdams, supra note 38 at 12 (discussing preferences and envy
among people).
One might also argue that shifting from absolute to relative preferences is
irrational in the more technical sense that the actor lacks "stable preferences."
See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 13, at 234 (explaining how rational decision
maker can rank outcomes in order of preference). "Preferences that are too
unstable to be represented by a utility function are irrational." Id. These shifts
are consistent with a stable utility function. Id. An individual could rank
preferences in descending order as follows: (a) making the exchange without
competition; (b) making the exchange and "winning" the bargaining; (c) not
making the exchange, but also not "losing" the bargaining; (d) making the
exchange but "losing" the bargaining because the other party did better on the
exchange. See id.
n44 Roger Fisher, William Ury & Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes 5 (Penguin 2d
ed. 1991). The authors, teachers of negotiation at Harvard Law School and
Harvard Business School, were associated with the Harvard Negotiation
Project. See id. at 199 (listing Harvard Negotiation Project's activities such as
theory building, education, training, publications and action research); see also
Alvin L. Goldman, Settling for More 17778 (1991) (emphasizing how loss of
respected status from embarrassment or humiliation may impede
negotiations).
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n45 Jeffrey Z. Zubin, Conflict from a Psychological Perspective, in
Negotiation: Strategies for Mutual Gain, 123, 127 (Lavinia Hall ed. 1993).
Where the parties are locked into a conflict, the effect can be the most
pernicious:
As the conflict escalates, there is a realization that both sides are going to lose
and the more they stay in the game, the more they are going to lose. This
results in an angry determination that the other side loses even more: 'We will
both go down the rat hole but I am going to make sure that you go down first
and a little bit further than I.'
Id.; see also Martin Shubik, The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in
Noncooperative Behavior and Escalation, 15 J. Conflict Resol. 109 local (1971)
(discussing classic game of such escalation); Schlomo Maital & Sharone L.
Maital, Economic Games People Play 1315 (1984) (explaining game of
escalation wherein rivals compete to get top bid).
n46 See. Michael C. Murphy, How to Sell Your Home in Good or Bad Times
90, 93 (1991) (advising house sellers conduct negotiations through agents
because of emotions involved); see also Andree Brooks, Useful Ploys in
Bidding, N.Y. Times, March 27, 1994, §10, at 5 (discussing how real estate
bidding process may cause competing bidders to overbid in order to win).
n47 Mark K. Schoenfield & Rick M. Schoenfield, Legal Negotiations 15455
(1988) (recognizing negotiator's pride often prevents him from acting in
client's best interest).
n48 See id at 155 n.118 (citing authorities dealing with facesaving). Such
tactics allow parties to reach agreement without losing status. See id.; see also
Philip Sperber et al., Attorney's Practice Guide to Negotiations 4547 (1985)
(discussing need of negotiating parties to have respect of other people).
Although the parties' concerns about their status are often simply categorized
as psychological, or emotional issues, this article seeks to show that economic
issues exist as well. See Schoenfield & Schoenfield, supra note 47, at 157
(discussing inserting new issues to obtain economic concessions); see also
Murphy, supra note 46, at 90 (discussing buyers need to win emotional
component).
n49 See Dixit & Nalebuff, supra note 42, at 20520 (explaining brinkmanship
concept of creating threat of disaster then forcing opponent back down). Game
theory does, however, show that even if the parties remain concerned only
about absolute preferences, strategic choices could lead to them foregoing a
mutually beneficial bargain in some circumstances. See id. One party could
adopt the strategy of brinkmanship, following a course of behavior that causes
a risk of the negotiations falling through, to prompt the other to settle before
the risk materializes. See id.; see also Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and
Influence 99105 (1966) (characterizing brinkmanship as manipulating shared
risk of war); Thomas C. Schelling, the Strategy of Conflict 199201 (1960)
(discussing brinkmanship in terms of keeping the enemy guessing). One way a
party could attempt brinkmanship would be to use status considerations: to
conduct the negotiations in a way that intentionally created a risk of status
obstructing the parties' bargaining. A party might also forego a beneficial
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bargain in order to build a reputation as a hard bargainer for purposes of
future transactions. See Baird et al., supra note 42, at 220 (discussing factors
underlying party's choice of reputation as tough bargainer over benefit of
deal).
n50 See, e.g., Baird et. al., supra note 42, at 219243 (discussing game
theoretic approach to noncooperative bargaining); Dixit & Nalebuff, supra note
42, at 286301 (noting bargaining approach including game theoretic examples
and rounds); Rasmusen, supra note 42, at 22744 (describing gametheoretic
bargaining approach involving economic theory); see also Katz, supra note 37,
at 23249 (outlining features of practical gametheory approach to bargaining).
n51 See Carolyn Janik & Ruth Rejnis, All America's Real Estate Book 28589
(1985) (discussing how pride and anger can interfere with bargaining and
obstruct mutually beneficial exchanges).
n52 See William G. Connolly, The New York Times Guide to Buying or
Building A Home 187 (1984) (noting seller's pride often influences selling price
of house).
n53 See, e.g., JANIK & REJNIS, supra note 51, at 28589 (listing examples of
when seller's pride interferes with negotiation of house's sale price).
n54 See infra note 91 and accompanying text (observing parties reluctant to
make concessions).
n55 See infra notes 9596 and accompanying text (discussing considerations
of status concerning negotiation issues).
n56 See infra notes 9294 and accompanying text (delineating negotiation
techniques during contracting).
n57 See generally William I. Miller, Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law
and Society in Saga Iceland (1990) [hereinafter Bloodtaking and
Peacemaking]. Miller makes little use of game theory or other economic tools.
See id. at 32. He notes that the struggle for honor has been seen as a zero
sum game (on the theory that honor can be gained only at the expense of
others). See id. An otherwise favorable review of the book by a leader in law
and economics halfseriously faulted Miller for not using game theory. See
Richard A. Posner, Medieval Iceland and Modern Legal Theory, 90 Mich. L. Rev.
1495, 1509 and n. 20 (1992) (noting Miller makes little use of game theory);
see also Paul Campos, The Untermensch as Ubermensch, 6 Yale J.L. & Human.
423, 427 n. 14 (1994) (reviewing William I. Miller, Humiliation: and Other
Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence (1993)). This recent book by
Miller illustrates the Prisoner's Dilemma through the use of a story from the
book. Id.
n58 Bloodtaking and Peacemaking, supra note 57, at 84.
n59 Id.
n60 Id. Indeed, Otkel had such an abundance of supplies that a subsequent
fire which destroyed part of his stores did not concern him. Id. at 86.
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n61 Id. at 81, 90.
n62 Bloodtaking and Peacemaking, supra note 57, at 7778.
n63 Id. at 85.
n64 Id. at 86.
n65 Id. at 8586.
n66 Id. at 90.
n67 Bloodtaking and Peacemaking, supra note 57, at 90.
n68 Id. at 30.
n69 Id. at 31.
n70 Id. at 53, 61.
n71 Id. at 3031.
n72 Bloodtaking and Peacemaking, supra note 57 at 90.
n73 Id. at 82.
n74 Id. at 86.
n75 Id. at 88.
n76 Id. at 8182.
n77 Bloodtaking and Peacemaking, supra note 57 at 89.
n78 Id. at 87.
n79 Id. at 86.
n80 Id. at 88.
n81 Id. at 91.
n82 See supra notes 4953 and accompanying text (setting forth facts and
analysis of breakdown in negotiations for house sale).
n83 See David D. Haddock & Fred S. McChesney, Bargaining Costs,
Bargaining Benefits, and Compulsory Nonbargaining Rules, 7 J. L. Econ. & Org.
334, 334 & n.1 (1991) (explaining notions of "thick" and "liquid" markets). In a
"thick market" or "liquid market" where there is a definite price for goods or
services determined by market conditions bargaining is unnecessary. Id. If the
market is "thin" or "illiquid," meaning that buyers and sellers negotiate prices
and other terms rather than simply take the market terms, bargaining is

18
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956651

necessary. Id.
n84 See U.C.C. § 2202 (1997) (allowing parol or extrinsic evidence to
explain or supplement but not contradict agreement's terms).
n85 Of course, the converse may also be true, that building a relationship
may make them welldisposed toward each other and increase the range of
agreement. Id. But here I will address only the former effect.
n86 See U.C.C. § 1203 (1997) (setting forth good faith requirement); § 1
102(3) (1997) (prohibiting parties to contract from disclaiming good faith
requirement). The general requirement of good faith is a mandatory rule that
cannot be waived by the parties. See Default Rules, supra note 9, at 87 (noting
duty to act in good faith immutable). The U.C.C., however, gives contracting
parties considerable leeway to define what constitutes good faith. See U.C.C. §
1102(3) (1997) (delineating when and to what extent parties may stray from
U.C.C.). In large measure, the content of the duty of good faith presents a
gapfilling, default rule.
n87 Cf. Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for
Mediation, 80 Va. L. Rev. 323, 33138 (1994) (distinguishing between
psychological barriers to conflict resolution and strategic barriers created by
rational parties). But see David Friedman, Less Law Than Meets The Eye, 90
Mich. L. Rev. 144, 147 (1992) (reviewing Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without
Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991)).
n88 See William Ury, Getting Past No: Negotiating with Difficult People 101
(1991).
n89 Id. at 111.
n90 See Zubin, supra note 45, at 123, 133 (observing each party's reluctance
to initiate request for fear of appearing weak).
n91 See, e.g., Fisher, Ury & Patton, supra note 44, at 29 (explaining people
may decline to accept reasonable proposal to avoid appearance of backing
down).
n92 See Goldman, supra note 44, at 184 (contending cultural stigmas of
weakness, indecisiveness or unreliability cause reluctance to retreat from
concrete positions); Robert A. Wenke, the Art of Negotiation for Lawyers 14
(1985) (stating some people consider concessions sign of weakness); see also
Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation 48 (1982) (advising
negotiators to anticipate making concessions so party does not have to make
all concessions).
n93 Cf. Connolly, supra note 52, at 182 (recommending giving other side
method to save face).
n94 See Fisher, Ury & Patton, supra note 44, at 8194 (developing strategy
of negotiation based on objective criteria).
n95 Id. at 83 (noting discussion of objective standards eases negotiation
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process).
n96 See Frank H. Buckley, Three Theories of Substantive Fairness, 19 Hofstra
L. Rev. 33, 4850 (1990) (noting goal of negotiation to strike balance between
extreme positions). Empirical research shows that extreme demands tend to
cause extreme counterdemands and to decrease the chance of agreement. See
id. 4950 (1990) (citing studies). See also Raiffa, supra note 93, at 52
(discussing bargaining experiment where pairs of participants divide $ 2). In
Raiffa's experiment, the researcher instructed one member of each pair to hold
out for $ 1.20. Id. Frequently, this caused the other member of the pain to
forego the 80 cents rather than agree to an unequal share. Id.
n97 Another possible legal response to the problem, at least in situations
where one party still wants the deal to go through, might be to impose liability
for bad faith in bargaining. Although such a cause of action has little judicial
support to date, commentators have argued for such a rule. See E. Allan
Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing
and Failed Negotiations, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 217, 22329 (1987) (suggesting
liability for benefit of the bargain); Kostritsky, supra note 1, at 64142
(encouraging liability for bargaining); G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust
in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44
Vand. L. Rev. 221, 23545 (1991) (suggesting imposition of liability for
precontractual negotiations). The use of default rules, however, has
advantages over that approach with respect to this issue. Such a cause of
action would require more than just a lost potential gain from trade. Otherwise
it would create a general duty to sell one's property to anyone who valued it
more than the owner. The plaintiff would likely have to show a substantial
reliance interest and opportunistic behavior by defendant, both of which would
be absent in many situations where status competition had obstructed a
mutually beneficial bargain. In addition, default rules operate ex ante to
prevent the problem, rather than ex post to attempt to repair it, which is likely
to be more difficult to accomplish and harder to justify as efficient.
n98 See supra notes 3336 and accompanying text (explaining Hadley rule
fosters efficient behavior).
n99 See Gerald R. Williams, Legal Negotiation and Settlement 1541 (1983)
(describing results of largescale study of practicing lawyer's negotiating
patterns).
n100 Id. at 5354 (focusing on cooperative strategy in attorney
negotiations).
n101 See supra notes 3337 and accompanying text (analyzing impact of
default roles on efficient disclosure of information).
n102 Cf. Default Rules, supra note 9, at 12425 (discussing court's difficulty
applying gapfillers where parties would have selected different terms).
n103 See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 13, at 99102 (asserting purpose of law
to remove obstacles of private bargaining) The authors state that a central
purpose of contract law is to "minimize the obstacles to private agreements
over resource allocation." Id. at 101. Cooter and Ulen term this principle the
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"Normative Coase Theorem." Id.
n104 Although contract law deals most directly with bargaining, legal rules
may affect status competition in negotiation in other areas. For example, a
model of bargaining to settle litigation typically will assume that parties
consider the monetary value of the dispute, the parties' estimate of their
likelihood of success, and the expected costs of litigation. See, e.g., Korobkin &
Guthrie, supra note 42, at 111116 (discussing empirical studies of settlement
practices); Cooter & Ulen, supra note 13, at 48192 (using game theory to
analyze litigation and settlement); Rasmsen, supra note 42, at 6065 (citing
Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 Bell J. of Econ. 539 (1983)
(discussing model with asymmetric information based on Png game)). Parties
in litigation, however, sometimes seek to obtain or avoid an injunction or
damages award as well as victory over each other as an end in itself. Cf.
Korobkin & Russell, supra; Robert Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An
Explanation of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 Ohio St. J. on Disp.
Resol. 235 (1993). Accordingly, one effect of the rules of procedure should be
to turn the parties' efforts away from status competition.
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